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The Right Honorable Sir Zelman Cowen*

In the Rear and Limping a Little:
Some Reflections on Medicine,
Biotechnology, and the Law:

The Roscoe Pound Lectures**
I
LECTURE NO. 1.
I am honoured by the invitation to deliver this series of Pound Lectures at the University of Nebraska. Though I have been a frequent
visitor to the United States since I first came to teach in the Law
School of the University of Chicago in the summer of 1949, this is my
first visit to this University. It follows a meeting with President Roskens in Australia at a time when I was Governor-General, and he
called on me in the national capital, Canberra. When I came to Oxford after retiring from that office, he extended an invitation to me to
come to the University, and I am specially pleased to come for this
purpose. There can be few lawyers who do not know the name and at
least something of the work of Pound. I have, in addition, a personal
link, because I met him when I came as Visiting Professor to the
Harvard Law School thirty years ago.
As Pound Lecturer, I am in distinguished company. I know all of
my predecessors by reputation, and most of them personally. Among
my books is the text of Warren Seavey's Cogitationson Torts,' which
he gave me when I was a visiting member of the Harvard Law School
Faculty in 1953-54. I came to Harvard then and again ten years later at
the invitation of Erwin Griswold, a great Dean of that school and later
Solicitor-General of the United States, and he, too, was a Pound Lecturer on Search and Seizure: A Dilemma of the Supreme Court.2 He
and I have been friends for many years. Julius Stone, whose subject
was Aggression in InternationalLaw,3 has been a long-time friend,
*
**

A.K., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Q.C., D.C.L. Provost, Oriel College, Oxford University.
These lectures were delivered on October 3 & 4, 1984 as part of the continuing
lectureship program in honor of Roscoe Pound.

1. W. SEAVEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTs (1954).
2. E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT (1975).
3.

J. STONE, AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (19-).
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and we were colleagues for many years as law professors in Australian
universities. His great contributions to the law and to jurisprudence
were acknowledged by the publication last year of a volume of essays
entitled Legal Change: Essays in Honor of Julius Stone.4 As Governor-General I wrote a foreword that was a short statement of appreciation of Stone's work and writings. In that volume, there were
references to Stone's relationship with Roscoe Pound. Stone was
much influenced by Pound's teaching and that is reflected in his own
teaching and writing. Stone's major work, The Provinceand Function
of Law,5 was reviewed by Pound in 1948, and the master wrote that he
found the book "so thoroughly worthwhile that I read every word of
text and notes most attentively."6
I have told that I met Roscoe Pound when I was a young Visiting
Professor at Harvard in 1953-54. He was then in his eighties and was
the editor of the NACCA journal. I had some opportunity for talk
with him at that time. He was still living when I came to Harvard a
second time, ten years later; he died at 93 in July, 1964.
These lectures honour him for his great contributions to the law
and jurisprudence; they fittingly honour him here, in the University to
which he first came in 1888. He was both botanist and lawyer; there is
a rare fungus, Roscopoundia, which he identified and which is named
for him. For a time he worked in both fields, but, as a writer in the
Nebraska Law Journal recounts: "[h]e was, however, a practical man
and it is said that he was influenced to finally settle upon a legal career by his belief that the profession had much to offer."7 He taught
some courses before he became Dean of the College of Law at the University of Nebraska in 1903. He held that office for a few years only,
until 1907, and as I have read the history, it is clear that his tenure was
important in setting the College of Law in the mainstream of American law teaching, through the pervasive use of the case method. He
had had a short experience of the Langdellian style method and philosophy at the Harvard Law School. He went from Nebraska successively to Northwestern, Chicago, and then to Harvard, and there he
built and confirmed his great reputation.
He is, of course, known as the great exponent of sociological jurisprudence. In his eight point program he argued that sociological jurists seek to enable and to compel law making whether legislative,
judicial, or administrative, and also the development, interpretation,
and application of legal precepts, to take more complete and intelligent account of the social facts upon which the law must proceed and
4. LEGAL CHANGE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JULIUS STONE (A. Blackshield ed. 1983).
5. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW (1946).

6. Pound, The Province and Function of Law, 51 HARv L. REV 724, 737 (1948).
7. Comment, 1903 & 1946: The Making and Remaking of the University of Nebrasks
College of Law, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 44, 45 n.1 (1978).
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to which it is to be applied. It is to an aspect, or to aspects, of this, that
these lectures are directed. It is the case that science and technology
present many challenges to laws developed in earlier times, and that
the changes they bring to society frequently require the reconsideration of existing rules. It is probable that science and technology present the most dramatic and insistent forces for change in our time. One
of my predecessors as Pound lecturer, Willard Hurst, has written that
the record of this century discloses that the law has not been very
successful in dealing with the social consequences of technological
change. He takes the case of the motor car: it has added vigour to the
economy and increasing opportunities for communication and recreation, but is has also imposed horrendous costs in life and personal injury, in urban sprawl and policing problems, in air and noise pollution,
and in the prodigal use of natural resources.
More generally it is the case, as Harvey Brooks observes in an essay
on Technology, Evolution and Purpose,8 that although science and
technology have provided us with the means to overcome scarcity for
everybody, it is less than self-evident that the actual application of
these means is compatible with such other goals as democracy, personal liberty, an aesthetically satisfying environment, the preservation
of pristine nature, or individual privacy and dignity.
II
In these lectures I propose to consider a specific case that commands wide public attention in our time. I have taken as my title, In
the Rear and Limping a Little, borrowed from the judgment of an
Australian judge who wrote, little more than a decade ago, that the
law marched with medicine, "but in the rear and limping a little."9 It
is in the field of medicine, of the life sciences and biotechnology that
some of the great contemporary challenges of science and technology
have presented themselves, raising great social, ethical, religious and
legal issues. In the opening chapter of its final report, the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behaviorial Research observed that the awesome powers
of medicine that are continually expanded by developments in the life
sciences have sparked growing public interest in what are now termed
"bioethical" issues.10 It is said that the scientific researcher has an
obligation to be as active in his moral as in his scientific imagination.
To the traditional matters of personal conscience for scientific workers, and for physicians and other health care workers, have been ad8. Brooks, Technology Evolution, and Purpose,109 DAEDALUS 65 (1980).
9. Mount Isa Mines, Ltd. v. Pusey, 4 S.Austl. St. R. 88 (1971).
10. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SUMMING UP (1983).
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ded the increasingly difficult questions that face courts and legislators
among others, as biomedical and behavioural scientists and practitioners explore new ways to conquer illness, to sustain organ functions, to
generate human life in new ways, and even to manipulate the genetic
basis of life itself.
The President's Commission was appointed to study and report on
the ethical and legal implications of issues in medicine and research,
and over the three years of its effective work and life, from 1980 to
1983, it performed an important task of public education through the
study of and report on problems whose value components were at
least as important as their technical aspects. There have been many
such enquiries and explorations: particular problems have been explored by commissions, committees, and law reform agencies. I was a
member of the Australian Law Reform Commission whose report,
Human Tissue Transplants,11has, I believe, been widely regarded as a
major contribution to the study of the legal and associated problems
that arise in this important and comparatively new area of biotechnology. Within the last few months, a major report of the Committee of
Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology has been published
in the United Kingdom.' 2 That committee (the Warnock Committee),
explored matters associated with artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, with and without embryo transfer, and associated matters.
That is one of a number of reports and enquiries undertaken in various parts of the world where human births have been achieved by
these methods, and where the ethical and legal issues that arise from
this technology have commanded wide and often anxious public attention and debate.
Again, issues have been raised in the public arena by groups with a
committed viewpoint, who are determined to press and make visible
that viewpoint. A conspicuous example is the case of treatment of seriously ill, newborn children and the "profound ethical issues" that
arise in the context of medical intervention (or other action) to preserve them alive or to allow them to die. This problem, as the President's Commission points out in its report Deciding to Forego Life
Sustaining Treatment,'3 is made the greater because of remarkable
advances in neonatal care and preservation that have taken place in
the very recent past. In cases arising in common law jurisdictions, particularly involving children born with Down's Syndrome, the issues
have been presented in various contexts: in criminal actions taken
11. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, HUMAN TISSUE TRANsPLANTS (1977).
12. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984) [hereinafter cited as WARNOCK REPORT].
13. PRSmENTS COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING

TREATMENT (1983).
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against doctors; in civil actions to compel surgical interventions to preserve the lives of newborn children against the wishes of parents, and
of doctors responding to such parental indications; even indeed in the
context of actions brought by the representatives of very young children alleging failure to act, with the consequence that they have been
born alive with birth defects that are said to result in "wrongful life."
The problems and issues extend in many directions. The capacity
of medicine and technology to prolong life and to postpone death
yields many benefits, but it also presents problems. As Russell Scott
says in his excellent book The Body as Property, the law has to be
framed to deal justly with the intractable problems of long term coma,
the helpless, dying aged, the hopelessly defective newborn, and other
human beings whose existence may be an intolerable burden to themselves, their families, and the community. 14 If all that society can offer is the criminal law of homicide within which to provide a legal
response to these problems, it will cause a great deal of injustice and,
at the same time, provide poor and inadequate opportunity for the
consideration of the problems. We have to take account of the point
that the value of life is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment,
but by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of
choice. The problems for the law in the resolution of such issues are
formidable.
In The Body as Property,Scott was concerned primarily with issues
that arise in the context of human tissue transplants, though his formulation of the problems posed for society by such medical and biotechnical developments is obviously of more general application:
The medical advance is followed by a period of shock during which the community-through its doctors, scientists, philosophers, theologians and
lawmakers-grapple with its wider significance. On balance, if it is believed
that society will derive a benefit, the burden of ensuring community acceptance is transferred to the lawmakers, who must devise laws that will enable
the medical and other necessary routines to be carried out lawfully, framing
them so as not to allow the procedures to trespass beyond the limits of community acceptance.

15

In the specific context of human tissue transplants, Scott pointed out
that we were dealing with new concepts of life and death, and with
unprecedented usage of the human body. Unless important issues
were clarified and resolved quickly, there was a risk that grave social
damage could be done, and that unacceptable practices could quickly
appear that might prove impossible or at least very difficult to eliminate. A legal vacuum was against everybody's interest, while dealing
with and responding to the issues on a random basis, as particular
questions arise, would be very unsatisfactory.
There is the scientist's argument that a premature attempt at legal
14. See generally R. ScoTT, THE
15. I& at 80.

BODY AS PROPERTY

(1981).
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regulation will not serve the public interest. So it is put that biotechnology is moving so rapidly that "if we have a Royal Commission or
introduce legislation now about recombinant DNA or in vitro fertilization or heart transplants or anything else of this nature, the ground
will have shifted before we have gone through the mechanics, the action will have shifted to the next level."16 So too, it is argued that it is
much better to use "soft-edged measures" depending on human judgment and decency, such as strong ethics committees including lay
members, to monitor research and treatment in laboratories and hospitals. In any case, it is said, the genie is out of the bottle and cannot
be put back.
This is the voice of a serious and concerned medical scientist, and
there can be no doubt that some of the issues that arise sit awkwardly
and inappropriately in a court setting. It may well be that the law in
particular cases may fairly say that the resolution of particular issues
can be appropriately left to the shared decision of doctor and parents,
without call for court intervention or approval. The scientist's statement, however, goes too far. It carries with it a very real danger of
conflict between scientist and technologists on the one hand and the
general community on the other, and this is not calculated to serve the
interests of scientific and technological advance that can be of great
benefit. The widespread debate over issues relating to in vitro fertilisation provide one example; in recent times, research with recombinant DNA is another. It must be said that the case for appropriate
legal regulation is very strong, and that in some areas it is patently
necessary. There are, however, likely to be areas of sharp disagreement as to what the law should say, because there are deep disagreements often of an ethical or religious character. This argues the case
for the fashioning of mechanisms and bodies that can monitor activities, courses of action, scientific, and technological developments, and
that can assure some measure of informed community understanding
and oversight of what is happening.
In some areas heavy burdens have been placed upon courts without
guidance otherwise from common law notions. American courts, for
example, have been faced with questions relating to the taking or organs and tissues from living persons. Generally speaking, the task of
the courts, without legislative guidance in such areas, is very difficult.
Lord Devlin in his reflections on the judge as law maker, points to the
constraints and limitations under which common law judges operate.17
Judges by themselves, he says, are not, as a body, the complete
lawmakers and it is unreasonable to expect that they should be. The
aid furnished to a judge under the English common law system is limited by the assumption that it is his duty to try the case. He has the
16. 1&.
17. L. DEvLiN, TuE JUDGE (1977).
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assistance of counsel who are there to argue the cases of their clients
and not to argue in more general terms the desirable course of development of the law. Moreover, the support available to judges in manpower, time and facilities for research is severely limited. "New law,"
says Lord Devlin,
ought not to be made until after consultation with the representatives of those
who will be concerned with it. Methods of achieving this have been admirably
developed by law reform bodies. This, of course, does not deny the obligation
of common law judges, the body of those who made the common law, to discharge their responsibility for keeping it abreast of the times; it simply asserts
that there are and should be limits to the assumption and expectation that law
reform and law making should come from judges. 1 8

We are not here to discuss modes of law reform and law-making
generally; we are concerned with problems relating to the law and
medicine, and biotechnological developments, often of far reaching
importance. It seems to me clear that in such areas as these that raise
novel questions, different methods and techniques are required. The
recently retired Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission, Mr. Justice Kirby, who presided over that Commission's enquiry
into and report on Human Tissue Transplants, and who has been a
remarkable and active publicist for law reform, has written about this
matter.' 9 He points out that the common law did not furnish adequate
or satisfactory direction on the many issues involved in human tissue
transplants. If transplantation was to proceed with assurance, legislative action was necessary, and in advance of that, consideration and
appropriate resolution of various issues of principle. Because of their
complexity, effective law reform called for distinctive procedures. In
the case of tissue transplants, there was a need for interdisciplinary
participation in the tasks: the Commission called upon doctors, scientists and technologists with a wide variety of relevant knowledge and
skills, as well as upon lawyers, and the views of philosophers, ethicists,
and theologians were also sought.
I was a member of the Commission at that time, and an active participant in this particular enquiry and report. I remember particularly
a day-long meeting of the Commissioners with a body of doctors
drawn from diverse but relevant specialties. The session was devoted
to the definition of death. That definition was of critical importance
for transplantation, though its importance extends beyond the case.
As the President's Commission has pointed out, the need for viable
organs to transplant does not account fully for the concern with the
definition of death; that concern rests more broadly on the need both
to render appropriate care to patients and to replace artificial support
with more fitting and respectful behaviour when a patient become a
18. Id
19. M. KiRBY, REFORM AND THE LAW 217 (1983).
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dead body. The need to update the criteria for determining death
stems from the realisation that the dedication of scarce and expensive
care facilities to bodies without brain functions may not only prolong
the uncertainty and suffering of grieving families, but also preclude
access to facilities for patients with reversible conditions.
The Chairman also pointed to another aspect of the Commission's
activity in the consideration of this reference: the ascertainment of
the sense of the general community. In the consideration of issues
such as human tissue transplants, and in vitro fertilisation, community views and attitudes, so far as they can be ascertained, are of substantial importance. So in this case laymen's discussion papers were
prepared and circulated widely; public hearings were arranged in various parts of the large country in which people might present their
views; and the media, especially television, were used quite effectively
to publicize and generate debate on the issues.
Regular law reform agencies, equipped and furnished with such resources and using such procedures, may serve the needs of adaptation
of the law to biotechnological change very well; again, it may be
judged desirable for specially constituted commissions of enquiry to
undertake such tasks. In respect of human fertilisation through artificial insemination and in vitro fertilisation and embryology, the British
procedure was to appoint the Warnock Committee, which has recently
reported after two years of deliberation. In Australia, where work on
in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer is well-advanced, special
committees have been appointed under the laws of a number of states.
The Australian Law Reform Commission in its report on human tissue transplants specifically declined to deal with issues relating to in
vitro fertilization and associated matters on the ground that "important social and moral as well as legal questions are involved [that] are
not appropriate for legislative attention in a general ordinance dealing
with transplantation." 20 That did not disclose a reluctance to tackle
these subjects, but rather a view that they raised many substantial independent questions and issues, which is certainly the case. So far,
that separate reference has not been forthcoming and the matter has
been considered, as I have said, by a number of commissions appointed
under state law. Their number, and the intense public debate over the
issues, give expression to the lively concern with these biotechnological issues and their implications. We shall consider these issues later.
III
Let me now speak more particularly about some of the major issues raised within the context of human tissue transplants. Those issues were drawn dramatically to public attention by the heart
20. AusTRALIAN LAW REFORM CoMM'N, supra note 11.
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transplant first effected by Dr. Christiaan Barnard in South Africa in
1967. That, of course, was not the first transplant either of regenerative or non-regenerative tissue; work had been progressing actively
since the latter 1940's, and transplants of corneas and kidneys had
been successfully undertaken for some years. Dr. Barnard's heart
transplant was, however, the case that captured world attention just
as, little more than a decade later, did the birth of Louise Brown in
England by in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer.
The heart transplant was the case, par excellence, in which issues
of critical importance arose to make it as certain as rules could that
the patient should have the greatest confidence that his doctor should
not become his executioner. That case focused attention on the need
for a definition of death; a heart transplant donor was of necessity a
dead person. More generally, of couse, the use of organs and tissues
from dead bodies was a very valuable and important source of material
for transplantation. For effective transplantation it was necessary to
have available material that was viable and not damaged or rendered
useless by reason of delay in removal and transplant. The development of ventilators and associated biomedical technologies made it
possible to maintain heart beat and respiratory functions in bodies
that had sustained total and irreversible loss of brain functions. At an
earlier time, when the use of a dead body was not a matter of concern
in this way, it was enough to define death without further refinement
in terms of classical criteria: the cessation of heart beat, respiration,
and circulation of the blood. The question now became one of seeking
a definition by reference to total cessation of brain function, ascertained in accordance with strict procedures. As I have pointed out,
this concern with the definition of "brain death" arises not only in the
context of tissue transplants, but there, for very practical reasons, it
has a special and urgent significance.
So it is possible to conjure up the prospect of "bioemporium" in
which, as Russell Scott writes, there are:
corpses. . . utterly unlike any corpses known throughout man's previous history... warm, respiring, pulsating, evacuating and excreting bodies, requiring nursing, dietary and general grooming attention.., long silent rows of
them, looking like any other patients would be laid out for the purpose of
being, in effect, farmed and harvested for the benefit of the living.2 1

That is unaccustomed and unpleasing imagery of a new world. The
definition of brain death certainly allows for organs physically to be
preserved for effective use within a dead but respiring donor body; it
allows for the respirator to be switched off without that act of switching off being ascribed as the cause of death. Even if we do not allow
imagination to range over cadaver farms, the fact is that an established
and a developing biotechnology makes the cadaver an increasingly im21. R. ScoTT, supra note 14, at 164.
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portant source of parts to meet an unsatisfied demand for tissue and
organs for transplantation. As medicine continues to find uses for
human tissue, we may come to see claims upon the dead body taking
on the aspect of a public entitlement. Are we to look forward to something approaching the notion of a life estate in the body, determinable
upon death, after which it will become available as a source of parts
for transplant into other defective but living bodies?
The debate on the terms on which organs and tissues may be removed from a body certified as dead takes on special significance in
light of this. I may illustrate this from the debate that took place
within the Australian Law Reform Commission on this issue. It was
generally accepted that authority was required for the transfer; it involved decision on principles as between the merits of two views. One
was expressed as "contracting in." It required that the deceased during his lifetime should have given authority for the removal of organs
or tissue, or, if he had said or indicated nothing, that the removal
should be approved by authorised persons, generally, though not necessarily, relatives. The other notion of "contracting out," adopted in a
number of legal systems, allows removal and transfer unless the deceased, in his lifetime, has expressly forbidden it. The Commission
after a debate, in which some support was voiced for the latter,
adopted "contracting in" on the basis that it was more closely in accord
with general community mores. In the Commission this was certainly
my view, not only as more in conformity with community attitudes,
but as a personal judgment. I am now disposed to think that Russell
Scott is right in arguing a case for the contracting out principle. He
writes:
I believe that western communities are prepared to allow the use of their dead
for the therapy of the living, provided that it is decently done. The great value
of human tissues is now established. I can see no objection to a law under
which the bodies of the dead may be promptly used for public health purposes.
Whether this position seems to interfere with preserving personal freedom
will depend on whether you believe freedom is something which should extend to your corpse. I do not believe that it should and moreover take comfort
from the fact that my law along with others of its kind, will allow everyone to
signify an effective objection2 2while alive. It is plain that such a law should be
accompanied by safeguards.

Does this set us on the slippery slope, so that if we move to accept
"contracting out," the next step will be to deny the entitlement of the
person to effective objection, so that a "contracting out" law may be
only the latest stopover in an unfinished journey to a destination
where all dead bodies will be compulsorily available to the state? If
this appears extreme, let me draw attention to a body of American
case law that in Scott's words "has created a unique and self-contained
legal process which appears to be without parallel in any other coun22. Id- at 260.
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try under which the law in a number of states will recognize and enforce claims made by the sick for the tissues and organs of living
persons." 23 Thus, in one case it was held that a kidney of a mental
incompetent of full age might be taken for transplant into the body of
his brother. 24 In another, it was held that the kidney of a seven-yearold twin (who for what it is worth, expressed herself willing) might be
taken for transfer to the other twin.25 There is a body of Massachusetts cases at first instance in which the courts have authorised the
transfer of both regenerative and non-regenerative tissue from the
26
bodies of minors and other incompetent persons.
It is a characteristic pattern in such cases that the tissues of donor
and recipient have been found to be distinctively compatible, and the
parents support and indeed encourage the giving of the tissue on
which the life of the recipient may depend. In a number of cases, the
courts have used the language of substituted judgment; that is to say,
the court has regarded it as open to it to provide the consent that the
minor or incompetent cannot actually or effectively give.27 Sometimes the court has found a psychological benefit to the donor in the
lifesaving gift to a grievously ill sibling.28
My own view is that this is a bad principle, and it is one to which I
am strongly opposed. I believe that the only valid principle upon
which a donation of tissue can be made by a living person is one that
requires effective consent. Where the person is a minor of a very
young age, or is otherwise incompetent and incapable of giving an acceptable or meaningful consent, I believe that no taking (which it is,
rather than donation) should be allowed, certainly in the case of nonregenerative tissue, and indeed in the case of regenerative tissue that
may require substantial intrusion, as for example bone marrow. I
should indeed prefer to make the principle general.
The Pennsylvania case of McFall v. Shrimp,29 raised the question
of a compelled donation of bone marrow from one adult to another.
Bone marrow is a regenerative tissue, but its removal requires a surgical procedure under general anesthetic. The plaintiff was suffering
from aplastic anemia and would die without a transfer of compatible
tissue. Shrimp was a cousin and the indications were that his tissue
was compatible. After one encouraging test, Shrimp declined to submit to any further procedures and McFall took action to compel him
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id at 116.
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
See, for example, the cases cited by R. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 115.
See generally id at 108-09, 111, 114-15, 120 & 156.
See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Strunk v. Strunk,

445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
29. The decision is unreported. For a discussion of the case, see R. ScoTr, supra note
14, at 127-37.
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to submit to further tests and to the removal for transfer of bone marrow. The court assumed jurisdiction, but declined to impose the obligation on Shrimp, though it was critical of his refusal.
The principle stated was that to compel Shrimp to submit to bodily
intrusion "would defeat the sanctity of the individual and would impose a rule that would know no limits and one could not imagine
where the line would be drawn." 30 It happened that the plaintiff died
shortly afterwards, but my view is that the decision is right and principled. This accords with the view of Russell Scott. He states the principle that:
[The individual is not primarily some kind of social debtor whose obligations
to the community outweigh, or do no more than balance his rights, powers and
privileges. Society and its laws should aim to promote personal autonomy and

individual liberty. Accordingly my law in relation to tissue removal from living persons would be expressed positively not negatively, and would allow donations of body parts by adults of sound mind, provided that it is done on the
basis of free and informed consent. 3 1

In respect of persons of full age and capacity, this would allow donations, including donations of non-regenerative tissue. To establish
that such donations were clearly in accordance with the law, the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended that they should be
authorised, subject to the requirement of the informed consent of the
donor. That commanded general agreement; so, too, did the proposition that it should not be lawful to take tissue from the mentally incompetent, of whatever age. This rested upon the basis that such
persons were incapable of giving informed consent and that there was
no other acceptable basis upon which such donations should be allowed; the Commission in this respect dissented from the holding of
some American courts.
In respect of donations of non-regenerative tissue by minors, the
Commission was divided. A majority would have allowed such donations subject to very stringent safeguards: that the donor and recipient were members of the same immediate family; that there was
independent medical advice that without the transplant there was a
danger of death; that there was parental consent; and that the donor
"had sufficient" mental capacity and consented. This provision for
consent was drawn in severely restricted terms, but the dissent that
denied any capacity to consent was based on the view that the great
urgency and emotional stress in such a case imposed a great, and even
overwhelming pressure on the minor donor to consent. The dissenters
took the view that so long as a notion of incapacity was retained in the
law for minors, this was pre-eminently the case in which it should be
preserved, and that any consent should be placed beyond reach.
30. McFall v. Shrimp, quoted in id. at 134.
31. Id. at 255.
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Scott deals very severely with this view, which he describes as an
"unbending logic .. .[that is]... not even good law or at least good
common law." 32 I do not know how that can be maintained. He says
further that the protection of the minor against such strong pressures
has to be balanced against the "tragic injustice" of a blanket ban: "the
denial of capacity to give an organ might lead to family tragedy, with
permanent and incaculable grief to minor and family and that is not
only unjust but morally wrong." 33 The framing of the matter in this
way shows what pressures there would be on a minor to consent, and
the case illustrates the great problems that confront the law-maker.
In Australia, those jurisdictions that have generally adopted the Law
Reform Commission's report, and draft legislation, have divided quite
sharply on this issue. Some allow the very restricted power of donation by mature minors. Others impose the blanket prohibition for
which the dissenters argued. On this matter I have not changed my
mind.
I have spoken about the requirement of consent by a donor to the
giving of bodily parts for transplant. This notion necessarily looms
large in the context of medical and surgical procedures, and certainly
in the area with which we have been concerned. It has special relevance in the context of experimental procedures on humans. It is also
relevant to the case of therapeutic procedures, and in a new technology involved in some major tissue transplants there are likely to be
both therapeutic and experimental elements.
There has been much concern with the notion of informed consent
following the revelation of the inhuman experiments carried out by
Nazi doctors on human subjects during the war. Their acts were
judged at Nuremberg after the war. It was said in a notable American
Symposium that, given what was done by the Nazi doctors in their
experiments with human subjects, it was altogether reasonable that
jurists, physicians, and many others would wish to reflect on that experience and seek to establish codes that would make such bestial activity impossible and unrepeatable.34 It would be difficult to overstate
the emphasis that this uniquely tragic European experience has given
to studies of the ethics of human experimentation. Out of a concern
with the violence done to human beings came an attempt to give definition to the conditions under which such experimentation might take
place. The Nazi case is unique in its extent and its horror, but there
are other cases that have come to light. These have prompted the
deeply disturbing judgment that it is no accident that research of a
32. I& at 257.
33. Id at 257-58.
34. Symposium, Ethical Aspects of Experimentationwith Human Subjects, 98 DAED-

ALUS 219 (1969).
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questionable nature has been conducted on the most vulnerable and
the most helpless: the institutionalised, the sick, and the poor.
Issues of consent are, or may be, complicated by the fact that procedures have both a therapeutic and an experimental character, and by
the fact that they are performed upon children. Children themselves,
by reason of varying maturity, have widely differing powers of understanding. There are therapeutic procedures for children where the
only meaningful consent can be given by a parent. Can a parent give a
consent to an experimental procedure on a child? Is such a notion,
unless there is a distinct therapeutic aspect involved, an acceptable
one?
A recent English case of a heart transplant to a newborn child
raises a crop of very difficult questions. Hollie Ruffy, a newborn girl,
was born with left-sided hypoplastic heart disease from which she
would inevitably have died. She received a transplanted heart. After
a period of days, during which her case was watched and reported with
intense and concern, she died of a variety of complications. In the aftermath many questions were asked. It appears that unlike the case of
the first adult heart transplant by Dr. Christiaan Barnard in 1967,
where he had accumulated knowledge from more than a hundred similar operations on animals, no comparable work had been done, or if it
had been done, it had not been recorded in the medical literature that
would apply to transplants in neonates. The distinguished surgeon
who performed the operation on the baby girl was reported as saying
that it was an experiment and that all surgery advances by such experiment. That surely is true, but expressed as baldly as that cannot be a
justification. Despite Dr. Barnard's preparations in the case of his operation on an adult in 1967, it was criticized on the ground of prematurity. Russell Scott, for example, reports that the failure rates were so
high, and the surgeons so inexperienced, that a strong adverse reaction developed and many hospitals throughout the world gave up
heart transplantation. 35 One of the most distinguished practitioners
in the field was reported as saying that "it wrecked the field for a good
five years." 3 6 It was not until the late 1970's that there was a global
resurgence inheart transplants thanks to improved surgical and aftercare techniques.
In the case of Hollie, it was not possible to make a reasoned judgment as to the outcome, had she survived. Questions posed by this
case might run as follows:
Would her new heart have failed to grow, so that at the age of five or six, she
might have had to have another transplant, with the possible result that if she

did not survive? Would her parents then have had to face the death of a child
they had learned, to love as a person? Would, as other cardiologists have sug35. R. Scorr, supra note 14, at 21.
36. Dr. Norman Shumway, quoted in R. ScoTr, supm note 14, at 21.
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gested, the heart have been efficient enough to enable her to grow physically
and mentally? There are many other unanswered technical questions. For
instance, what dose of immuno-suppressant drugs does a baby of this age need,
and to what extent will this dose increase her liability to cancer later?

If we turn to the question of consent to what was concededly an
experimental procedure, though essentially bound up with the future
survival of the child, it is obvious that the only consent can be given by
the parent. In the case of this child's disease there was little time, and
in some cases the decision would have to be made within hours of
birth. In such cases, are parents confronted with the child's situation
in a fit emotional state to make a decision? The implications for the
future of the child, and it may be for the future of the marriage and
the family, cannot easily be thought through by parents who have the
urgent responsibility for giving consent.
These are issues that are now in the forefront of discussion where a
decision has to be made to preserve or to attempt to preserve seriously
ill newborn children. Some of these cases involve decisions whether
to carry out comparatively routine and well-established surgical procedures on children with other continuing defects like Down's Syndrome. In the case of Hollie the procedure was a heroic one, quite
untried, and with unknown and possibly threatening consequences. Is
it open, in the interests of the child, to allow the parent to consent in
such a case? It is very difficult to answer no; it is a question still
whether, having regard to the existing state of knowledge, it is a permissible procedure on newborn humans. There are other questions
that have been widely debated in the aftermath of this case. The costs
in terms of money and particularly in demands on skills and other
human and physical resources are very great; in a situation of limited
resources and great competing demands, what priority is to be given to
experimental surgery of this character?
Not all of the questions raised by this case could be appreciated by
a nation watching and reading the tragedy of Hollie Ruffy. The questions that this application of the biotechnology of tissue transplant
raised are a complex of legal, moral, and ethical and resource issues,
and I doubt whether the laws already in place, and only recently in
place, in respect of tissue transplants, provide clear answers to the
problems posed by this case.
IV
LECTURE NO. 2
I spoke yesterday about biotechnological developments in the field
of organ and tissue transplants, and of the responses of society and the
law to these developments. Once it is established that the human
body has value as a stockpile of curative materials, the question of
ownership and use of a dead body assumes a new importance. In this
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case, since the technology requires viable organs and tissue for transplantation, there is need for precise rules for the determination of
"death," though the heart may still beat in a respiring body. In such
cases, it allows for a respirator to be switched off without that act being ascribed as the cause of death. In the case of a live person who
may provide organs or tissue for transplantation, it is of critical importance to formulate the terms and conditons on which such material
may be taken for transplant. In this context, questions of informed
consent and the capacity to give consent are of central importance.
The resolution of the many complex issues depends significantly on
moral and value judgments within a community. These may shift as
the new technology develops and becomes more assured, and as its
applications and benefits are more fully understood and accepted.
There may be tensions between the individual's claim to autonomy of
his person and the community's claim to the resouces of his body.
This technology focuses directly, though not exclusively, upon
death, the end of life; another major current development in biotechnology directs attention to issues associated with the beginnings of life.
The former Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission has
spoken aptly of a number of riddles now being presented to our legal
systems by advancing medical technology as it affects the beginning of
life. Within the space of little more than a decade, two spectacular
achievements in biotechnology attracted world wide attention. In December, 1967, Dr. Christiaan Barnard in South Africa successfully
transplanted a human heart from a necessarily dead donor to a recipient. In July, 1978, shortly before full term and by caesarian section,
Louise Brown was born in the United Kingdom.
In the latter case, in November, 1977, Mr. Patrick Steptoe and Dr.
Robert Edwards had extracted a ripe egg from the body of Mrs. Lesley
Brown and fertilised it in a dish with her husband's semen. It was
grown for a short period of days in a nutrient in the laboratory, and
the embroyo was then implanted in Mrs. Brown's uterus where it attached and grew to full maturity. It was said of this achievement that
it was a giant step towards the full laboratory control of human reproduction. A commentator, reviewing the major events of 1978, wrote
that "[t]he most important birth of the year (leaving aside the little
Metternichs and Mozarts who have not yet made themselves known)
was of Louise Brown conceived in a laboratory dish. That fertilization
was less important as an achievement than as an omen; in biology, as
37
in politics, power is expanding faster than ethical understanding."
Harvey Brooks says that a particularly brilliant technology may give a
spurious brilliance to an inadequate vision.3 8 Whether this is apt to
describe the case of biotechnological advances in human reproduction,
37. Will, The Mind Reds, NEwswEEK, Dec. 25, 1978, at 13.
38. Brooks, supra note 8.
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it is demonstrably the case that the technology outstrips the law, and
that the time cushion between scientific and technological change, and
the need for governmental and social reactions, is now greatly diminished, if it has not completely disappeared. While scientists are in a
hurry and are hustling society, society for its part is, not surprisingly,
slow to evolve its attitudes, particularly in cases that raise issues that
go to the core of human being. Biotechnological achievement and invention often find an unprepared and largely inchoate public opinion.
In the aftermath of these biotechnological developments in human
reproduction-and medical doctors, scientists and technologists in my
own country, Australia, have been in the forefront of this work and
research-governments, professional, and other concerned bodies
have established enquiries to assess the work and its implications, and
to make recommendations. In the United Kingdom, where the first
successful birth by in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer was
achieved in 1978, government set up a committee in 1982, the Committee of Inquiry Into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (known as
the Warnock Committee, for its Chairman), to consider recent and potential developments in medicine and science related to human fertilisation and embryology. The Committee was to consider what
policies and safeguards should be applied, including consideration of
the social, ethical, and legal implications of these developments, and to
make recommendations. The committee reported in mid-1984, and
the London Times, noting in advance that the report was to appear in
this year, observed that it was a date that those with doubts over recent medical developments regard as having ironic Orwellian
overtones.
The Warnock Committee drew attention to social and legal
considerations:
It would be idle to pretend that there is not a wide diversity in moral feelings,
whether these arise from religious, philosophical or humanist beliefs. What is
common... is that people generally want some principlesor other to govern
the development and use of the new techniques. There must be some barriers
that are not to be crossed, some limits fixed beyond which people must not be
allowed to go. Nor is such a wish for containment a mere whim or fancy. The
very existence of morality depends on it. A society which has no inhibiting
limits, especially in the areas with which we have been concerned, questions
of birth and death, of the setting up of families and the valuing of human life,
would be a society without moral scruples. And this nobody wants.3 9

Relating this more particularly to the issues of legal controls and regulation, the Committee observed that:
[Tlhe development of science and medical technology in the field of human
fertilisation opens up many new issues for the law. In vitro fertilisation, for
example, has brought about situations not previously contemplated in relation
to which there is no law at all or such law as exists was designed for entirely
different circumstances. We believe that new laws will be necessary to cope
39. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
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with the new techniques for alleviating infertility and their consequences and
to deal with the developments in research in the field of embryology. But we
foresee real dangers in the law intervening too fast and too extensively in areas where there is no clear public consensus. Furthermore both medical sci40
ence and opinion within society may advance with startling rapidity.

To what developments and biotechnological work and research do
these general and elegantly stated formulations apply? There are,
first, the techniques of artificial insemination that antedated the recent successful achievement of in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer. These include the cases of the artificial insemination of a woman
with the sperm of her husband (AIH), and artificial insemination of a
woman (normally with the consent of her husband) with the sperm of
a third person (AID). Then there are the procedures of in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer. We start here with the most common
case, "the simple couple centered paradigm," illustrated by the 1978
case of Louise Brown, which involves only husband and wife as the
providers of gametes and the wife as carrier of the child to delivery.
There is further case, within this general description, in which the embryo, fertilised from husband and wife gametes, is frozen, subsequently thawed and implanted in the mother. The first reported case
of live birth achieved by this technique was in Australia early in 1984,
when a girl, Zoe, was born.
There is, next, the case of the use of donated gametes (sperm or
ova or both), and of donated embryos (either fresh or frozen), which
may be implanted in a mother who may or may not have a genetic
relationship to the child, depending, of course, upon whether the ova
are hers, but who, in any event, carries the child to be brought up as
her own.
The next case is that of surrogacy. Of surrogate motherhood Russell Scott wrote that the community is barely aware of the practice, let
alone at a stage where any consensus has begun to emerge, and that
there exists the clearest evidence that the practice of surrogate motherhood is underway and that it already raises extraordinarily difficult
social and legal issues.41 The surrogate mother carries the child to the
point of delivery, by agreement with other parents to give it up at
birth to them. There are various cases. They include the natural insemination of the surrogate by a man with the consent of his wife
(who is the intended mother for whom the child will be carried by the
surrogate), artificial insemination, and in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer, in which the surrogate mother may be simply a "womb
carrier" without any genetic relationship to the child. The surrogate
"womb carrier" may provide service for a woman with a medical condition that precludes her from carrying a child to delivery; it may be
40. fd. at 7.
41. R. Scorr, supra note 14 at 217-21.
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that she is a carrier of convenience for a woman who wishes to be free
of the risk or burdens of child-bearing. A recent writer speaks of a
surrogate as serving as carrier for "a busy female litigator (who) may
hire a woman to carry her baby for her."42 There is some prospect
that the skills of such a hirer will be needed in litigation with her
surrogate.
All of this may make for complex situations. It is now possible for
a child to have up to five parents in the course of its manufacture and
handing over for upbringing: an egg donor; a sperm donor; a surrogate
mother who carries the fetus to delivery; and the couple who raise it.
A writer in the American Bar AssQciation Journal, perhaps ominously, comments that "many of the participants in [this] 'collaborative reproduction' are insufficiently protected by the current laws."43
There is another issue that arises out of this technology that has
generated and continues to generate intense, even passionate debate.
It concerns in vitro fertilisation without embryo transfer; it arises out
of the desired use for research and experiment by scientists and biotechnologists of embryos produced by in vitro fertilisation that are
surplus to the requirements of embryo transplant or which may be
grown specifically for purposes of research and experimentation.
V
These are the main cases and issues that have been the subject of
consideration and report. The Warnock Committee reported in the
middle of 1984 in the United Kingdom on all of these issues. In Australia where, as I have said, work in the forefront of this biotechnology
is being carried on, a series of reports has been produced. Notable
among these reports are those of the Waller Committee in Victoria,
Australia." That Committee was charged in 1982 with the task of
considering "the social, ethical and legal issues arising from in vitro
fertilisation."45 It has issued three reports in 1982, 1983, and, very recently, in 1984. The first dealt with the "most common case" and it
approved, with appropriate safeguards and supervision, the practice of
in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer in the case of the "simple
couple centred paradigm."4 6 In its second report, it considered and approved, though not unanimously, the use of donated gamates and embryos. In its third report, published very recently in 1984 (of which I
42. Andrews, The Stork Market- The Law of the New Reproductive Technologies, 70
A.B.A. J. 50, 53 (1984).
43. Id, at 56.
44. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SoCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES
ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILISATION (1982) [hereinafter cited as WALLER
COMMIrrEE].
45. Id. at 1.

46. Id.
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have seen only a summary statement), the Waller Committee dealt
with the use of frozen materials, with surrogacy, and with embryo experimentation. It is a commentary on the tensions that arise on the
one side between science in a hurry, and fortified by the wishes of
potential parents in a hurry, and the community and its agencies in a
state of uncertainty and divided opinion on the other, that the first
birth of a child with the use of a frozen and thawed embryo took place
before the Committee had reached a decision on the matter. This, it
seems to me, justifiably attracted criticism; there was also some criticism of the action as "precipitated" by other scientific workers in the
field.
The techniques and practice of artificial insemination are now
well-established. In the case of insemination by a husband (AIH),
there has been persistent opposition on the part of those who oppose
all of these procedures on the ground that deviation from the natural
processes of birth can never be countenanced. There has been active
debate-given prominence in the world press recently by the
Parpalaixcase in France-on the propriety of the use of the semen of
a dead husband that has been stored, to inseminate his widow. In such
cases, there are questions of law involving succession to property, specifically, whether a child born in these circumstances is a child of the
father. This technology raises many such questions. For example,
what effect will the technology have on the Rule Against Perpetuities
in its classic form? There is a wider range of questions impacting on
the law of wills, and the techniques of freezing of gametes and embryos will allow of births many years after the gametes have been produced or the embryos first fertilised.
Another recently reported case that has also been given wide publicity in the world press concerns the fate of a frozen embryo deposited in Australia by a wealthy, non-Australian couple who were
subsequently killed in an air crash outside Australia. The wife (Mrs.
Rios) provided an ovum that was fertilised by a donor gamete and the
embryo was frozen and banked for future use, which was frustrated by
the death of the parties. The future of the embryo has become a subject for quite intense debate; one of the issues is the right of succession
to the substantial estate of its depositors. The technology produces
some bizarre outcomes, and issues and rules must be formulated for
the resolution of such questions. The Warnock Committee in the
United Kingdom, in the context of AIH, recommends that there
should be no right of succession by a child to a father unless the child
was in utero at the time of the father's death. The Committee also
recommends that the law should provide that any child born following
in vitro fertilisation, using an embryo that had been frozen and stored,
who was not in utero at the date of the death of the father should be
disregarded for the purposes of succession to and inheritance from the
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father. Such rules appear to me to be reasonable and to provide necessary certainty.
AIH in the case of a dead father raises less tangible considerations,
and in the Parpalaixcase the question was the entitlement to use his
sperm to inseminate his widow. The Warnock Committee indicated a
general disapproval; such action might give rise to profound psychological problems for child and mother and should be "actively discouraged." Beyond stating a recommended rule relating to testamentary
succession, however, it was not prepared to recommend the blanket
prohibition of the use of a dead husband's sperm. I share the Committee's unhappiness with this procedure. I have very real difficulty with
the notion of crossing the barrier of death in such cases, and I would
be disposed to prohibit the use of semen in such a case. This comparatively simple application of the new biotechnology exposes the difficulty in making judgments for a community.
AID exposes a wider variety of problems. Notwithstanding the
consent of the husband, the intrusion of a third person donor (even
though he is unknown) into the relationship between the married parties raises a moral and ethical issue that is not present in the case of
AIH. In British law that intrusion is not regarded as adultery, but on
common law principles the child is illegitimate, is not a child of the
marriage, and the male relationship and obligations arising from the
birth of the child are those of the donor and not the husband.47 Such
matters must obviously be dealt with if the practice of AID is to be
accepted and made regular. The Warnock Committee noted that, as
late as 1960, a government committee in the United Kingdom had disapproved the practice of AID, but that this had not stayed its growth,
and judged that AID should be regarded as a "legitimate form of treatment for those infertile couples for whom it might be appropriate." 48
This view has been accepted elsewhere, in the United States and in
Australia, and this acceptance carries with it broad acceptance of the
principle that the AID child should in law be treated as the legitimate
child of its mother and her husband where they have both consented
to the procedure. Moreover, the parental relationship is established
with the husband and not with the semen donor. The Warnock Committee, concerned that the practice should be properly conducted and
administered, and not operated clandestinely, required that AID services should be provided only by a licensed authority with appropriate
procedures, and that risks, such as those of possible incestuous relationships in a subsequent generation, should be reduced by limiting
the number of semen uses derived from any single donor.
In such ways the law is called upon to respond to the problems
47. See, e.g., MacLennan v. MacLennan, 1958 A.C. 105; WARNOCK
note 12, at 20.
48. WARNOCK REPORT, sup~ra note 12, at 23.

REPORT,

supra
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posed by the use, indeed the expanding use, of artificial insemination
procedures. All of these are cases of dealing with the consequences of
a comparatively simple technology. The issues that arise from in vitro
fertilisation and embryo transfer are more complex. There are in the
first place, the religious objections that also apply to artificial insemination, and which have been expressed very strongly in the in vitro
case. In the mid-1950's, the Pope declared the procedure and its outcomes to be "immoral and absolutely unlawful": only the conjugal act
is deemed ethically worthy of giving life to a new human being, and
for this reason fertilization in a laboratory dish is seen as morally
wrong. Many modern Catholic theologians formulate the objection in
terms that "the technology procures human sex cells for the laboratory production of human beings which are at the mercy of scientists
for irreverent manipulation. Fertilisation loses its truly human
character."
This objection is not generally shared; Jewish law, for example,
does not condemn in vitro fertilisation-embryo transfer (IVF-ET)
withint the "parent centred paradigm." There is, however, an objection to IVF-ET that rests on an ethical-moral judgment not necessarily
derived from church doctrine. It is framed in terms that it sets us on
the road to human battery farming; it represents the destruction of
the notion of personhood in the creating of a child. So it is said that it
is better to stop the whole business; once we take the first, allegedly
compassionate step in the case of the couple centered paradigm, we
will inevitably do what we have done with nuclear technologies and
"go uncontrollably to the very end of the line." At the end of this road
lies Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, populated by persons planned
and graded, produced to political, social, and economic specifications in
laboratories and factories, with the process of gestation taking place
outside the human body. As to this, it is said that ectogenesis, complete gestation outside the human body, as Huxley envisaged it, is now
only a speculative possibility. The Warnock Committee put it that
"such developments are well into the future, certinaly beyond the
time horizon within which this Inquiry feels it can predict." 49 The
Committee also recommended that the growing of an embryo in vitro
and without implantation beyond fourteen days should be a criminal
offense. This was proposed in the particular context of the limits of
experimentation; it would obviously block attempts at achieving
ectogenesis.
The question, of course, is whether legal prohibition is capable of
restraining the use and development of technology that holds out so
much attraction to infertile people. The Warnock Committee stated
the case for the acceptance of in vitro fertilisation and embryo trans49. Id. at 61.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:548

plant very simply: the technique will increase the chances for some
infertile couples to have children, and for some couples this will be the
only method by which they may have a child that is genetically entirely theirs. For other infertile parents the extended applications of
IVF-ET make it possible for them to have children who may have
some more limited genetic link, or may make it possible to have children who have no genetic link with them. This is already the case
with adoption; it may add to the available "stock," and for what it signifies, a mother who has no genetic link with her future child may
carry it in utero to birth. Certainly the pressures are strongly in favour of expanding the scope of available in vitro provision. The recommendations of both the Warnock and the Waller Committees
against recognising and authorising surrogacy arrangements have
been angrily criticised on the ground that they deny or limit the possibility of children to infertile couples. There are, however, those who
question the use of donor gametes in in vitro fertilisation. As was said
by a member of the Australian (Waller) Committee, in voicing his dissent to the recommendation that the donation of gametes should be
recognised:
In a matter as sensitive as infertility such an alternative blend of argument
may not find a ready response amongst those directly involved: the scientists
excited at the prospect of a new field of research or a challenging clinical exercise may resent the intrusion of other disciplines and of the public into what
they may have come to regard as their exclusive experimental domain; the
infertile, for whom no-one who has been engaged in any field or caring can
lack understanding and sympathy, may feel aggrieved when their fellows in
society question the validity of the data upon which expectations have been
fostered and the desirability of the genetic permutations and combinations
which might possibly translate those expecations into reality.5 0

It is a powerful argument, and it exposes the difficulties and pressures that a society faces in setting limits to an exciting scientific and
technological enterprise, particularly where, as in this case, its promised outcomes have such a powerful appeal. In the case of artificial
insemination, doubt and disapproval have yielded to the pressures of
practice, and once artificial insemination by a donor is accepted, necessarily involving the intrusion of a third party into the married biological relationship, it is not easy to see how to sustain an objection to the
use of donor gametes in IVF. So it is that the Warnock and other
Committees accept it. For myself, I have a personal difficulty with it,
as I have a difficulty with the use of gametes derived from dead persons. It has to do with my own perhaps not very perfectly thought out
views of the human condition and of the relationships of human gen50. WALLER COMMITTEE, supra note 44, at 52 (dissent). See also CoMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOcIAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL ISsUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FER-

TILISATION, REPORT ON DONOR GAMETEs IN IVF 49-50 (1983) (dissent)
[hereinafter cited as Donor Gametes Dissent].
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erations. The Australian dissenter to the recommendation that IVFET by donor gametes should be allowed, put it that
a society is no mere agglomeration of individuals. Its members live the same
life in the past by reason of their traditions and share in the prolongation of
life into the future through common aspirations. Everyone therefore has a
right to trust in [his] ancestry 5and
everyone has an obligation to be a reposi1
tory of trust for [his] progeny.

Of course we make exceptions for adoption, for children who are
already born without the assistance of the new technologies, and for
whom adoption may offer the prospect of a better life. It may be very
desirable (notwithstanding the warnings of not being able or allowed
to stop at that point) to continue and recognise IVF-ET within the
most common case, the husband-wife dyad. Once we go beyond that,
as for example in artificial insemination, and more especially in the
area of IVF, and give it legal acceptance, we open up a new prospect
for humanity that I do not much like. In any event, it may be that the
law will not be able to stay the tide, and that, as in the case of AID,
there may be a retreat into secrecy with no checks, no standards, and
no controls, and "nothing to be heard through the soundproof doors of
the laboratories." We are told that "the genie is out of the bottle."
It is a consequence of acceptance of the extension of IVF procedures to allow donations of gametes outside the husband-wife area,
which is the most common case, that it becomes necessary to formulate legal rules relating to parental status, entitlement, and responsibilities. The principles proposed for AID would fix the husband of the
mother who has borne a child by IVF-ET by the donation of semen, as
the father; the donor of the semen would have no parental rights and
obligations. The recipient of a donated ovum provides a new case.
The Warnock Committee sensibly proposes that the mother is she in
whose body the child is carried, and that the ovum donor will have no
rights and obligations in respect to the child.
Central to the recommendations of the committees that have considered these great issues of admissibility of procedures for the alleviation of infertility, is the acceptance of the need for comprehensive
supervision and controls over the conduct and development of these
procedures, and over those persons who operate them, and over those
who conduct research in this area. The Warnock Committee contemplates the establishment of a licensing authority, broadly based in its
membership, which will be invested with statutory powers over a wide
range. The notion is that all places (including banks for the storage of
fresh and frozen gametes and embryos) and all persons providing fertility services must be licensed. The reason for this is clear: it is plain,
as the Warnock report says, that the protection of the public demands
the existence of an independent authority for these purposes. Few
51. Donor Gametes Dissent, supra note 50, at 54.
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people, as Russell Scott says, would contemplate with equanimity the
proliferation of storefront embryo banks where passers-by could
purchase take home fetuses, or, perhaps more realistically, the storage
in a few small refrigeration units of enough reproductive material to
create a new nation. The licensing and controllig authority is pivotal
to the whole scheme; it will have to devise step-by-step a "moral and
legal framework" which, as best it can, it will have to devise from its
understanding of human society, its values and its purposes.
VI
The pages of the contemporary daily and periodical press bear continuing testimony to intense popular interest in and concern with
these. issues. Some of the particular cases are dramatic. Madame
Parpalaix fights in a French court for the release of her dead husband's semen to allow her to bear a child by him. The debate over the
frozen embryo that Mrs. Rios banked in Melbourne before she and her
husband were killed in South America in an aircraft accident raises a
variety of questions. The wealth of the Rios parents makes the succession entitlement of the embryo a more prominent issue than it might
otherwise have been. There is the bigger question: what is the future
of the embryo? In the city in which the Rios embryo is banked, a child
has earlier been born by IVF-ET from a frozen and thawed embryo.
The Rios parents, now dead, have left no directions for the future use
or disposal of the embryo. The recent reported announcement that
the embryo will be allowed to die has generated angry protest from
some sources, though it appears to me that there is no satisfactory alternative. In any event, no assurance can be given that the embryo, if
implanted in a uterus, would adhere and grow to maturity. Further,
in whom and by whose authority is it to be implanted, and what will
be the implications for parenthood?
Another case: great prominence was given in England early in
1984 to the birth of quadruplets by IVF-ET to a woman, Mrs. Smale,
who was living in a stable de facto relationship with a man whose semen fertilised her ova, producing multiple embryos that were implanted. She had earlier been sterilised, having had children, but
wished for children by her defacto husband and had been admitted to
an infertility program. The doctor responsible for these IVF procedures was reported as saying that while he would have preferred a
single birth, multiple implantations were a better assurance of that
outcome. In the event, in this case, quadruplets, produced from the
four of the implants, were the outcome. It is a spectacular case, and
raises questions. Among them: is it an acceptable procedure to allow
the possibility of such multiple births? It may be that techniques will
improve and that there will be a better assurance of success without

19851

MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND THE LAW

573

the need for multiple embryo implants. More generally: is what was
done in the Smale case a justifiable use of IVF-ET technology?
It is not really surprising that such spectacular and dramatic cases
and issues should attract such wide attention. The fact is, however,
that these reproduction technologies, and particularly IVF, are the
subject of widespread and comprehensive discussion in the public
place. An Australian newspaper publishes frequent reports on developments in this area under the head of The Destiny of Creation. Some
years after the birth of Louise Brown, and after the scientists and biotechnologists, while concentrating on the most acceptable and common case, have shown that they are capable of doing much more and
have been insistently arguing the desirability of doing more, the issues
are exposed in a variety of ways. This is given focus by the publication
of able reports that discuss the great issues involved in the laboratory
creation of human life, or at least of the beginnings of human life. So
we are brought face-to-face with the questions discussed in this hour.
Are the procedures of IVF-ET at any level justified? Is this an area in
which the scientists and biotechnologists have become so preoccupied
with exploring the limits of their technological capacities that they
have had little time and, it may be, have shown little inclination to
ponder the moral significance of what they are doing? In the case of
the English IVF quadruplets, is it fair comment that "the test tube
baby teams are all bristling with academic excellence and technical
skills, but who is to provide the wisdom?"
VII
It was inevitable that surrogacy, the bearing of a child by a woman
with an agreement to give it up to be raised as the child of other parents, should have assumed an added importance in consequence of the
development of the new reproductive technologies. Surrogacy is not a
new thing; there are biblical accounts of a surrogate bearing a child for
another, conceived naturally by the intended father. As I said earlier,
the modern cases involved artificial insemination, in circumstances in
which the intended father is the semen donor, where the donor is another person, and by in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer. In the
latter case the surrogate may have some genetic relationship to the
child. The end case, however, is the surrogate "womb carrier" without
any such connection. By agreement she may carry the embryo of the
husband and wife who are the intended parents, and the reasons for
such an agreement may vary: it may be the incapacity or serious difficulty of the intended mother to carry it; it may be for reason of convenience, or the avoidance of interruption of career, or of discomfort
and risk.
The Warnock Committee judged that "the question of surrogacy
presented us with some ofthe most difficult problems we encoun-
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tered." 52 At one level surrogacy can be exploitative; it may be seen as
the sale of the use of the body and as degrading the process of childbirth. From another viewpoint, it may be seen as a genuine, sympathetic provision of assistance to a husband and wife-it may be to
someone in their own family-which affords them the only possibility
of having a child who is genetically their own. Between these cases lie
the variations. The Warnock Committee and other Committees were
aware of the fact that commercial surrogacy services have appeared,
offering surrogacy contracts for reward, part of which represented
payment to the surrogate mother, part the fees of the organisation.
Such surrogacy organisations have emerged in the United States and

elsewhere. The author of The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, notes that in at least twenty-four of the
United states the law provides that paying a mother in connection
with her giving up a child for adoption is illegal,5 3 and that there have
been specific decisions that deny enforceability of an agreement by a
surrogate for reward to hand over the child for adoption.54
Lawyers avoid restrictive laws by arranging for surrogate adoptions to take place in states that do not prohibit payment. We may in
time build up a new province, or at least new applications in the conflict of laws. There are, certainly, many problems associated with surrogacy agreements. For example, assuming no illegality in limine, is
it possible to provide in the contract clauses governing the conduct of
the surrogate during the period of gestation, to assure the best health
of the child? Problems have arisen out of agreement that the surrogate and her husband will abstain from sexual relations during a specified period to ensure that there is no doubt about the parenthood of
the child. If the child is born with some mental or physical defect, are
the contracting parents obliged to accept it pursuant to the surrogacy
agreement and, if not, what are the liabilities towards such a child and
by whom are they owed? If a surrogate bears a child derived from an
ovum from the female contracting party, who is the mother at birth?
The normal contemplation in IVF-ET is that the mother giving
birth is the mother. Is the case different where there is a surrogacy
agreement and the ovum is that of the woman for whom the child is
carried? The Warnock Committee specifically recommends that even
in such a case, the person carrying the child should be the mother.
Then, there is a question whether any surrogacy agreement can be
specifically enforced; and whether considerations of the welfare of the
child prevail over contract terms. What if the surrogate mother
changes her mind and will not voluntarily give up the child?
The view of the majority in the Warnock Committee, which did not
52. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 12, at 54.

53. Andrews, supra note 42, at 52.
54. Id See also Doe v. Kelly, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
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traverse all of these issues, was that surrogacy for convenience alone
was "ethically unacceptable." The majority recommended legislation
to render criminal the creation or operation in the United Kingdom of
agencies whose purposes included the recruitment of women for surrogate pregnancies or the making of arrangements for individuals or
couples who wished to make use of the services of a carrying mother.
Such legislation was to cover both profit and non-profit organisations.
It was proposed further that the legislation should be sufficiently wide
to render criminally liable the activities of professionals and others
who knowingly assist in the establishment of a surrogate pregnancy.
The Committee did not propose to extend the criminal law to all private surrogacy arrangements; it was recommended, however, that all
surrogacy agreements should statutorily be declared to be illegal contracts, and therefore unenforceable at law.
There was a dissent that seems to me to be persuasively argued. It
starts from the position that public opinion is not yet clearly formed
on surrogacy, which has only recently assumed prominence. While accepting that surrogacy for convenience should not be permitted and
that there should be no place for commercial operations in surrogacy
as in adoption, it should be recognized as fact that the demand for surrogacy in one form or another would continue to grow. Couples with
medical problems would seek surrogacy services as a last resort and
would turn to their doctors for support and assistance. To confront
them with criminal sanctions is likely to drive them to clandestine activity, with attendant health and other risks. The preferred course
would be to avoid blanket illegality, to give to the general licensing
authority charged with oversight of the regulation of infertility services and research the power to license agencies to make arrangements
for surrogacy, which might include payment to a surrogate mother.
The appeal of the dissenters to leave the door "slightly ajar" in the
case of surrogacy seems to me to be prudent. It is in accord with at
least some of the Australian discussion of this issue, and it seems to
me unwise at this early stage to impose so rigorous a prohibition upon
the use of surrogacy. In any event, blanket prohibition is not likely to
be effective in bringing the practice to an end.
VIII
It is fairly said that there is no more controversial bioethical issue
than that of the extent of the protection to be given to embryonic and
fetal life. The question arises in the context of in vitro fertilisation
without embryo transfer, and relates to the use for purposes of experimentation and research of embryos that are surplus to the needs of
implantation, or that are brought into existence specifically for research purposes, or come into existence as a result of other research.
A Roman Catholic Archbishop in Melbourne, Australia, which is a
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principal center of IVF work, characterizes experiements of human
embryos as "callous, immoral experiments on living human beings."
An Anglican counterpart in the United Kingdom says of the view that
early embryos are "human beings" and therefore to be protected
against experimentation, is "somewhat absurd." A characteristic view
of a scientist and biotechnologist is stated by Dr. Edwards, who with
Mr. Steptoe undertook the work that resulted in the birth of Louise
Brown in 1978: "I believe that the need for knowledge is greater than
the respect to be accorded to an early embryo."
The great divisions over this issue are revealed in the Warnock report in the United Kingdom. The majority formulated its approach to
the problem in terms that
Although the questions of when life or personhood begin appear to be questions of fact susceptible of straightforward answers, we hold that answers to
such questions in fact are complex amalgams of factual and moral judgment.
Instead of trying to answer these questions directly we have therefore gone
straight to the question of how is it right to treatthe human embryo? We have
considered what status ought to be accorded to the human embryo, and the
answer we give must necessarily be given in terms of ethical or moral
principles. 5 5

The answer given by the majority is that the embryo of the human
species should be afforded some distinct protection at law, that in its
early development, fixed at up to fourteen days after fertilisation, experimentation may take place, but not beyond that time. The fixing of
that time is set by reference to the development of the embryo. There
are varying views on the precise length, and the Warnock time is a
conservative one. The argument in favor of research is expressed in
terms of importance of outcomes. Other animal research will not provide a substitute for the use of human embryos, and the Report directs
particular attention to the study of disorders occurring only in
humans, such as Down's Syndrome, research into the processes of
human fertilisation, or perhaps into the specific effect of drugs or toxic
substances on human tissue. The time limit is, as I have said, derived
from the development of the embryo; the Warnock recommendation is
that (allowing for the special case of a frozen embryo) an embryo that
is not implanted may not be kept alive for more than fourteen days,
and that is should be a criminal offense to handle or use a reserach
subject any live human embryo beyond that limit. No embryo that has
been used for research should be transferred to a woman by implant.
Research on embryos may only be undertaken under license given by
the general licensing authority. The majority concluded that as a
practical proposition it was appropriate to allow research on embryos
whatever their provenance; that is to say whether surplus to implanta55. WARNOcK REPORT, supra note 12, at 60.
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tion or produced specifically for research or coming into existence as a
result of other research.
Four members of the Committee dissented on this point, and
would only allow research on surplus embryos; they would have rejected the creation of embryos specifically for research and experiment. Three members dissented fundamentally; they would have
accepted in vitro fertilisation for embryo transfer only. Their human
potential made it improper to allow any use, including that of research
and experiment, beyond that. This was supported by the view that
any concession would open the floodgates; that pressures for extending the time period and character of research and experiment
would grow and could not easily be resisted.
These division expose the formidable difficulties in resolving these
questions, and they are also exhibited in the recommendations of
other reports. There are obvious implications in this great debate for
other forms of fetal research and what is said, in this context, exposes
issues that arise in debate over abortion. Here the law-maker finds
himself with issues for decision that bear upon basic views about the
human condition. For my part, I believe that the majority in the Warnock report provide sensible outcomes that I would support. At the
end it has to be said, however, that at times, in the name of the human,
it is necessary to say "no" to what one type of technology or science
can do; we have to be aware of the danger of dehumanising a whole
section of life that is central to our humanity.
Whether Roscoe Pound would have approved of my treatment of
these matters I cannot know. I am certain, however, that he would
have agreed that they are of great consequence, and that while they
are of concern to society in which lawyers play only a part, that part,
the legal response to a powerful technology, is very important.

